The Israel-Palestine Conflict and the true meaning of ‘security’

Governments are not representative. They have their own power, serving segments of the population that are dominant and rich.

– Noam Chomsky

States are not moral agents, people are, and can impose moral standards on powerful institutions.

– Noam Chomsky

It is the absolute right of the state to supervise the formation of public opinion.

– Joseph Goebbels

The empires of the future are the empires of the mind.

– Sir Winston Churchill

You may deceive all the people part of the time, and part of the people all the time, but not all the people all the time.

– Abraham Lincoln

Security’s a term which is bandied about a lot. While security’s important, it has at least two definitions. The one that people are familiar with and you can find in any dictionary, and the one used to describe what ‘security’ means in political discourse. Civil liberties, the core of any free and decent life, are typically counterposed against security needs. Therefore, what security means, and what consequences this meaning entails, are extremely important to understand. This post uses the Israel-Palestine Conflict as a case study to identify the meaning of security and flesh out the ramifications involved. This will hopefully have instructive conclusions for how populations should regard states and, as a result, what actions they should therefore pursue.

Security means protection for, and advancement of, the interests of whoever has the means to influence and utilise states, or equivalent entities. Therefore, this primarily means elite interests, and peripheral, secondary care for the interests of everyone else, with level of attention being more or less commensurate with socioeconomic status. Other elements come into play, such as racism and sexism, but they’re subordinate to the preeminence of material resources and the political power they provide for those who possess them. Indeed, elites often create, or at least take advantage of and manipulate, racist and sexist tendencies in order to meet their own essentially financial objectives. The Israel-Palestine Conflict’s an excellent example of this. The following discusses the history of the conflict, and analyses what so-called ‘security’ means for the three primary actors involved: the US, Israel and the Palestinians.

In the late 19th century, Zionist Jews, mainly from Eastern Europe, began to settle in Palestine with the vision of establishing an exclusively Jewish state in Eretz (Greater) Israel (Pappe, 2006, pp. 10, 282; Finkelstein, 2003, pp. 10-20). By today’s geography, this vision included Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Transjordan (Jordan), though it typically no longer includes Jordan (Finkelstein, 2003, pp. 10-20). Their numbers and lands were small compared to the indigenous Palestinians, making up only 6% of the population in Palestine in 1914 and 16% in 1928, by which time they owned 4% of the land (Pappe, 2006, pp. 282-83). As an early point, it’s worth noting the fact that, in 1947, the Zionists won a state comprising roughly 56% of a region in which they had existed for less than 70 years, were still a minority, and owned a mere 5.8% of the land (Pappe, 2006, pp. 34-5). This illustrates the political favour which the Zionists had curried with the world’s great powers, most significantly Britain, which supports the meaning of security put forward in this post. Not to mention that this was despite the fact that Britain’s own Peel Commission recommended in 1937 that just 33% of Palestine be assigned for a future Jewish state, from which, incidentally, indigenous Palestinians would need to be removed (Pappe, 2006, pp. 284).

Perhaps even more interesting, the US King-Crane Commission noted in 1919 that, although it had “a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause,” to impose a Jewish state on the Palestinian people “would be a gross violation of the principle [of self-determination], and of the people’s rights, though it kept within the forms of law” (Chomsky, 1983, p. 91). Consequently, it recommended that Jewish immigration be limited and the goal of a Jewish state be abandoned (Chomsky, 1983, p. 91). Nevertheless, as British Secretary of State, Lord Arthur Balfour, author of the Balfour Declaration, put it in 1919:

The four great powers are committed to Zionism and Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land (Chomsky, 1983, p. 90).

Clearly, since they didn’t have the means to influence British policy, the present needs and future hopes of the Palestinians were of little moment against the Zionists. Unsurprisingly, the King-Crane Commission’s conclusion was “disregarded by the great powers, including the US” (Chomsky, 1983, p. 91). This demonstrates that security means serving the interests of those with the ability to influence states, often with scant or no regard for law, morality or justice.

To further substantiate the meaning of security proposed in this post, it’s useful to look at the period 1917-47 to see what the Palestinians and Zionists were doing, and compare how Britain responded to each group’s actions. Indeed, Britain’s responses throughout the period are very telling. Palestinians vociferously protested large-scale Jewish migration to Palestine. Both were engaged in terrorism. In 1931, Zionists formed the Irgun, a terrorist paramilitary organisation founded to support more militancy against Arabs. In 1938, its bombings killed 119 Palestinians. That same year, Palestinian bombs and mines killed 8 Jews. Subsequently, Britain deployed military reinforcements to quell the Palestinian rebellion protesting mass Jewish migration and Britain’s complicity in the events.

Further, as mentioned, the 1937 Peel Commission recommended partitioning Palestine into two states after Britain abandoned proposals for a bi-national state when the Zionists opposed them. That same year, Britain dissolved all Palestinian political organisations. In 1939, Britain approved a White Paper which planned conditional independence for Palestine after 10 years and the immigration of 75,000 more Jews over the next 5 years. And, fatefully, in 1947, being weary and bankrupt after WWII, Britain declared its withdrawal from Palestine, knowingly leaving an enormous power vacuum which resulted in the 1947 UN Partition Plan, in which Zionists received a share of Palestinian lands wildly disproportionate to their population. When you compare the treatment that each group received from Britain, it’s clear that the ability to influence politics was decisive, not justice or law.

This same reality has defined the Israel-Palestine Conflict since 1967-70, with the US replacing Britain as the hegemon providing the support Israel needs to carry out its designs (Chomsky, 2003, p. 161). During 1947-67, however, Israel continued somewhat without the powerful ally to which it’d so far been accustomed. In fact, in this period, the US had, at times, a tenuous, frosty, and even hostile relationship with Israel (Chomsky, 1983, pp. 20-3). For example, in the Suez Crisis in 1956 the US ordered Britain, France and Israel to stop as they invaded Egypt to attack the Suez Canal. However, it must be noted that even prior to 1967, Israel still “received the highest per capita aid from the U.S. of any country”, though this can’t compare to the tremendous, essentially unwavering and consistently increasing support that Israel’s received from the US since 1967-70 (Chomsky, 1983, pp. 9-12). Largely due to this support, Israel’s developed the world’s fourth most powerful military, an advanced industrial economy, and very successfully waged wars and smaller military offensives against its neighbours, including Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, as well, of course, as ongoing domination and subordination of the Palestinians (Chomsky, 1983, pp. 9-10). These include the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the First Lebanon War in 1982, and smaller military incursions into Gaza: Operation Cast Lead in 2008-9, Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, and Operation Protective Edge in 2014.

To understand why US foreign policy on Israel shifted during 1967-70, we’ll analyse what security means for the US. First, we’ll identify what motivates US foreign policy, why this motivates it, and what this means for US foreign policy on Israel-Palestine. Second, we’ll look at why the US-Israeli relationship became what it is today during 1967-70. This covers two key events which illustrate that the meaning of security in contemporary global politics is indeed as this post proposes.

Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) point out that the US-Israeli relationship is unusual, since it’s not based on a compelling moral case for supporting Israel and doesn’t greatly benefit US strategic interests (p. 2). Indeed, oftentimes it’s detrimental to stated US interests and objectives – and yet:

For the past several decades, and especially since the Six-Day War in 1967, the centerpiece of US Middle Eastern policy has been its relationship with Israel…Since the October War in 1973, Washington has provided Israel with a level of support dwarfing that given to any other state. It has been the largest annual recipient of direct economic and military aid since 1976, and is the largest recipient in total since World War Two, to the tune of well over $140 billion…This largesse is especially striking since Israel is now a wealthy industrial state…Washington also provides Israel with consistent diplomatic support. Since 1982, the US has vetoed 32 Security Council resolutions critical of Israel, more than the total number of vetoes cast by all other Security Council members. It blocks the efforts of Arab states to put Israel’s nuclear arsenal on the IAEA’s agenda. The US comes to the rescue in wartime and takes Israel’s side when negotiating peace…One American participant at Camp David in 2000 later said: ‘Far too often, we functioned…as Israel’s lawyer’…This extraordinary generosity might be understandable if Israel were a vital strategic asset or if there were a compelling moral case for US backing. But neither explanation is convincing (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, pp. 1-2).

Why are the strategic asset and moral explanations not convincing? As a strategic asset, Israel’s often costly, burdensome and even counterproductive for the US. During the October War in 1973, $2.2 billion in emergency military aid given to Israel triggered an Opec oil embargo which damaged Western economies. This support wasn’t cheap, even for the US, and yet, ironically, Israel was still unable to protect US interests in the region, as the US couldn’t rely on it when the Iranian Revolution in 1979 threatened the security of Middle East oil supplies, having to resort to its own Rapid Deployment Force. Further, Israel couldn’t participate in the Gulf War in 1990 or the 2003 invasion of Iraq, despite having the world’s fourth most powerful military, being eager to be involved, and being a close US ally, since its participation would’ve jeopardised the anti-Iraq coalitions the US had developed.

Nor does Israel help to prevent terrorism. Indeed, Israel’s actions generate terrorists who pose threats to the US and other states around the world. In fact, “saying that Israel and the US are united by a shared terrorist threat has the causal relationship backwards: the US has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so closely allied with Israel, not the other way around” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 3). This equally applies to the so-called rogue states in the Middle East, since “they are not a dire threat to US interests, except inasmuch as they are a threat to Israel” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 3). Indeed, “even if these states acquire nuclear weapons…neither America nor Israel could be blackmailed, because the blackmailer could not carry out the threat without suffering overwhelming retaliation” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 3). To make things worse, “[Israel] does not behave as a loyal ally. Israeli officials frequently ignore US requests and renege on promises (including pledges to stop building settlements and to refrain from ‘targeted assassinations’ of Palestinian leaders)” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 3). Plainly, the strategic asset case has many weaknesses.

As for the moral case for supporting Israel, some argue that, because of the unique suffering of the Jewish people throughout history, the US, as the world’s supreme economic and military power, ought to support and protect Israel. However, whatever one thinks about the claim that Jews have uniquely suffered more than any other people, the creation of Israel “brought about fresh crimes against a largely innocent third party: the Palestinians” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 5). Indeed, even David Ben-Gurion admitted that:

If I were an Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country…we come from Israel, but two thousand years ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti-Semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that? (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 5).

Therefore, the moral case for supporting Israel holds no water.

The question then becomes, if these reasons don’t explain why the US supports Israel, what does? Mearsheimer and Walt argue that “the explanation is the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby…the loose coalition of individuals and organisations who actively work to steer US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 6). This argument has some merit (Chomsky, 2007, p. 229). However, it mistakenly embellishes the power of the Lobby because it fundamentally misunderstands the nature of so-called ‘US democracy’ (Chomsky, 2007, p. 229-30). If you assume the US is a functioning democracy in which the people decide what policies their state pursues, and yet the US’s foreign policies largely threaten the people’s interests and security, it’s reasonable to deduce that the democratic process must be being manipulated and undermined by some abnormal and powerful force. This reasoning led Mearsheimer and Walt to the Israel Lobby, but this isn’t a novel argument (Chomsky, 1983, p. 13). Indeed, many other people have drawn the same conclusion for more than 30 years, and have all succumbed to the same illusions as Mearsheimer and Walt (Chomsky, 1983, p. 13).

The genuine answer lies in the reality of so-called ‘US democracy’. Despite pronouncements of being the leader of the free world and a paragon of functioning democracy, the US is anything but. In political systems with parties which depend on capital to survive, the people with the greatest access to capital will always have the most political influence – the elites (Baker, 2006, p. v; Chang, 2009, pp. 31-7). Since this is true of the US, and its business community’s exceptionally wealthy and entrenched, this translates to elites with considerable political power, which in turn disenfranchises the majority of the American population (Baker, 2006, p. v; Chang, 2009, pp. 31-7; Herman & Chomsky, 1988). This is what Gilens and Page (2014) found when they analysed American ‘democracy’. They found that the US is best characterised by Economic Elite Domination and Biased Pluralism, both of which involve elites having disproportionate political power that excludes and marginalises the majority of the population (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 2). Indeed, “economic elites and organised groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence” (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 2). The primary concern for the US is therefore the privileged interests of the American business community, not the people or the state, which is merely a tool in the hands of the elites.

Tying this back to the Israel-Palestine Conflict, the key point is that supporting Israel is in the interests of the elites. For example:

A State Department analysis of 1945 described Saudi Arabia as “…a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” The U.S. was committed to win and keep this prize. Since World War II, it has been virtually an axiom of U.S. foreign policy that these energy reserves should remain under U.S. control. A more recent variant of the same theme is that the flow of petrodollars should be largely funneled to the U.S. through military purchases, construction projects, bank deposits, investment in Treasury securities, etc. It has been necessary to defend this primary interest against various threats (Chomsky, 1983, p. 17).

The material prize, which has since extended from Saudi Arabia to mean Middle East oil reserves more generally, therefore serves the interests of the American business community through revenue for US corporations and strategic power by which the state, animated by elite interests, can force the rest of the world to follow Washington’s orders if it wants access to Middle East oil. That’s the true reason behind US foreign policy on Israel: it acts as a regional Sparta enforcing US control of Middle East oil, and receives support to carry out, and as thanks for, its services. The US was convinced that Israel could play this role during 1967-70, which is why the US and Israel developed, and have since maintained, such a special relationship.

So what happened during 1967-70? On two occasions, Israel displayed its military capabilities and convinced the US that it could act as a regional Sparta enforcing American foreign policy. There’s an important background to these events. Chomsky (1983) points out that independent, secular Arab nationalism is a threat to US control of the Middle East and its oil reserves, since the indigenous people, if given the chance to exert their will democratically, might prefer that they benefit from their own resources, rather than American corporations (pp. 20-1). Incidentally, the US has to subvert democracy in the Middle East and support friendly dictators and monarchs who cooperate with its policies. For example, this is why the US supported Saddam Hussein in Iraq, installed the Shah in Iran, and has long supported the Hashemite Monarchy in Jordan and the King of Saudi Arabia. In this context, the events in 1967 and 1970, to which we now return, explain why the US chose to forge such remarkable and enduring ties with Israel.

In 1967, Nasser in Egypt was the world’s main source of secular Arab nationalism (Chomsky, 1983, pp. 20-1). The potential spread of Nasserite Arab nationalism, especially to the Gulf oil-producing states, was a threat to US interests in the Middle East, against which Israel was seen as a buffer (Chomsky, 1983, pp. 20-1). At the same time, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, perhaps the US’s most valuable ally in the region, were engaged in a proxy war in Yemen (Chomsky, 2007). Thus, when Israel attacked Egypt during the Six-Day War in 1967, it blocked the spread of Arab nationalism and damaged an enemy of Saudi Arabia (Chomsky, 2007). This was an enormous service to Washington. In 1970, Jordan was massacring Palestinians in the West Bank during so-called Black September. For a time, it seemed as though Syria might intervene against Jordan and come to the Palestinians’ defense (Chomsky, 2007). The US was mired in Indochina and couldn’t personally support its Jordanian ally, but, at Washington’s behest, Israel mobilised and Syria backed down (Chomsky, 2007). Again, this won Israel major favour in the halls of American power.

Henceforth, Israel received the lion’s share of US economic and military aid, as well as unparalleled diplomatic support at the UN and passionate ideological support from US media throughout their broad sphere of influence. Since US interests remain the same and Israel remains willing – often enthusiastic – to be America’s private Sparta, the US-Israeli relationship has continued to grow and deepen along those lines up to the present. Thus, the critical factor at play is the ability to gain support from the elites who truly wield American power, as was the case with Britain before the US. Plainly, the particular hegemon involved isn’t important, since the meaning of security and the resulting power relations are exactly the same regardless.

While US interests are therefore the decisive force behind the Israel-Palestine Conflict, the interests that motivate Israel are also worth looking at, since they further corroborate the meaning of security proposed in this post. Israel’s interests are the same ones which Zionist settlers first began to pursue in the late 19th century – an exclusively Jewish state in all of Eretz Israel, from which the indigenous Palestinians must be somehow removed (Finkelstein, 2003, pp. 16-7). Chomsky (2010) substantiates that this is, and always has been, Israel’s ambition:

[Israel’s illegal policies of occupying, settling and annexing Palestinian lands, which have] roots in the pre-state period, trace back to the earliest days of the occupation, when the basic idea was formulated poetically by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who was in charge of the occupied territories: “the situation today resembles the complex relationship between a Bedouin man and the girl he kidnaps against her will…You Palestinians, as a nation, don’t want us today, but we’ll change your attitude by forcing our presence on you.” You will “live like dogs, and whoever will leave, will leave,” while we take what we want (p. 103).

This involves ongoing illegal settlement building in the West Bank and periodic incursions into Gaza which are euphemistically referred to in Israel as ‘mowing the lawn’. Israel’s primary interest is therefore Eretz Israel, not the population or the state, both of which are, in fact, needlessly endangered by pursuing this lasting objective when Israel could easily have accepted a two-state settlement with the Palestinians along the internationally recognised pre-June 1967 border anytime since at least 1976 (Chomsky, 1983, p. 67; Hari, 2010). However, because there’s enough money bound up in Israel’s ongoing militancy, the campaign for Eretz Israel continues to be the great interest that shapes the imperatives of Israel and the US (Honig-Parnass & Haddad, 2007, pp. 123-7).

Meanwhile, the Palestinians either suffer in obscurity and neglect, or increasingly resort to radical Islam and terrorism for solace, revenge and in an attempt to make political gains. All terrorism is a crime, to be sure, but it is the inevitable consequence of US-Israeli imperialism. Incidentally, Nelson Mandela and his African National Congress did much the same against the brutal and intransigent South African apartheid regime. The principal objective for the Palestinians is to gain statehood for their rightful land within the pre-June 1967 borders, as defined by UN Resolution 242. This so-called two-state solution has been publicly supported by both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority for years (Pappe & Chomsky, 2008). However, since the Palestinians don’t have anything to offer the American or Israeli elites who shape their states’ policies, the US remains committed to Israel and Israel remains committed to gradually annexing all Palestinian lands (Finkelstein, 2003, pp. 16-20).

Thus, as a case study, the Israel-Palestine Conflict unambiguously demonstrates that the meaning of security in contemporary global politics is protection for, and advancement of, the interests of whoever has the means to influence and utilise states, or equivalent entities. If we reflect on this conclusion, it has important implications for how we ought to regard the states that presume to act on behalf of the populations from whom they derive legitimacy (at least in the supposedly democratic West), and what actions that regard might justifiably entail.


Baker, D., 2006. The Conservative Nanny State: How the Wealthy Use the Government to Stay Rich and Get Richer. 1st ed. Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research.

Chang, H.-J., 2009. Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. 1st ed. New York: Bloomsbury Press.

Chomsky, N., 1983. Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: South End Press.

Chomsky, N., 2007. Beware of State Power [Interview] (1 April 2007).

Finkelstein, N., 2003. Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. 2nd ed. London: Verso.

Gilens, M. & Page, B. I., 2014. Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens. Perspectives on Politics, 12(3), pp. 564-581.

Hari, J., 2010. Is Gideon Levy the most hated man in Israel or just the most heroic?. [Online]
Available at:

Herman, E. S. & Chomsky, N., 1988. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. Updated ed. of 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books.

Honig-Parnass, T. & Haddad, T. eds., 2007. Between the Lines: Readings on Israel, the Palestinians, and the U.S. “War on Terror”. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Mearsheimer, J. J. & Walt, S. M., 2006. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. London Review of Books, 28(6), pp. 3-12.

Pappe, I., 2006. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. 1st ed. London: Oneworld.

Pappe, I. & Chomsky, N., 2008. On the Future of Israel and Palestine: An Interview With Ilan Pappe and Noam Chomsky [Interview] (6 June 2008).


The Reality of Israel-Palestine: Part 1

The US-Israeli Relationship

Holding up the supply of shiny new weapons is America’s traditional slap on Israel’s wrist. But an embargo is ineffective unless it is certain to last … Much more effective would be the belief in Israel that this time an American president will stick wit his policy, including if need be a lasting embargo on arms and a rethink of the extent of America’s aid.

 – The Economist, London, September 11, 1982, cited in Noam Chomsky’s “Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians”, p. 2

[Menachem Begin, Former Prime Minister of Israel, 1977-83] has shown that whatever protests this or that American administration might make against the expansion of Jewish settlement or the infringement of human rights, in the West Bank, he has been able to strengthen his grip on the area without any diminution of American aid. Indeed, he is even anticipating an increase … Indeed the American Government has been financing the very policies it denounces with such consistency that one doesn’t have to be an Arab to wonder if the denunciations are sincere.

 – Chaim Bermant, “Financial Influence”, Jerusalem Post, Dec. 19, 1982, cited in Noam Chomsky’s “Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians”, p.109

This post is the first installment of a three-part series that will describe and explain the history and current reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, and what marginal role Australia has played, and continues to play, in the enduring situation. The first installment, this current post, illustrates that the situation in Israel-Palestine is defined by Israel doing whatever it wants because it has the lasting and essentially unwavering support of the US, and has since 1967-70. It goes through the history and causes of the situation in detail to explain why Israel and the US have this special relationship, and why it has meant, and continues to mean, joint Israeli-US repression of, and terror against, the Palestinians. This post also shows how these actions are and have always been in flagrant violation of international law, UN resolutions and sometimes even US law.

The second installment applies the argument from the first post to several wars and conflicts in which Israel has been involved since its formal creation in 1947. In doing so, the post does two things. One, it talks about the propaganda and demagogic myths which surround the wars and conflicts of 1947-49, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 1987 and 2000, and attempt to hide, transform or completely fabricate Israel’s involvement in the events. This lays out more of the history in closer detail and helps to dispel certain illusions under which people might otherwise be acting. Two, this provides evidence to support the argument from the first installment of the series which then enables us to draw a conclusion about its likely validity. Thus, the second installment expands on and reinforces the line of argument begun by the first.

The third installment of the series applies this broad discussion to a narrower area than the ones prior: Australia’s small, but telling, role in the history discussed in the previous two installments. This focuses solely on some of Australia’s recorded votes in the UN on topics to do with Israel-Palestine and uses these votes to further expound on how the US-Israeli relationship is able to proceed in the way it does despite being patently illegal and despicably heinous. This lends additional support to the argument which broadly connects the three installments and brings the series to a close.

I hope not to make these posts too cumbersome to read, but I won’t sacrifice necessary content for expediency. The things said may resonate with some, polarise others and leave the rest uncertain and/or indifferent. But I encourage everyone reading to read each post as a whole and then make up your mind rather than premeditatedly dismiss the arguments for being too alien or because of some other objection. With that, I’ll begin the first installment of my Israel-Palestine series: the US-Israeli relationship.

When you talk about the US-Israeli relationship from Israel’s creation in 1947 until now, you need to recognise that the relationship was very different during the periods before and after 1967-70. This fact and the circumstances surrounding it are key to understanding the US-Israeli relationship and what outcomes it produces. Therefore, the following covers the periods before and after 1967-70, and explains how and why the US-Israeli relationship has changed from 1947 to the present; what this has meant for the US and Israel; and, broadly speaking, what consequences the US-Israeli relationship has produced.

Below is an excerpt from Noam Chomsky’s (1983) “Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & The Palestinians,” which masterfully critiques the interwoven relationship between the US and Israel, and its consequences. The content is exactly the same, but I’ve slightly adjusted the footnoting and deleted the endnotes. If you’re interested, though, you can find the PDF version here. In terms of the PDF, the whole excerpt below comes from Chapter 2: The Origins of the “Special Relationship”, while specifically the first paragraph comes from pages 61-2, and the remainder comes from pages 66-9. Noam Chomsky is a world-renowned intellectual, linguist, activist, author and long-standing professor at MIT. Paul Robinson, writing for The New York Times, February 25, 1979, said that “Judged in terms of the power, range, novelty and influence of his thought, Noam Chomsky is arguably the most important intellectual alive today.” He is also ethnically Jewish, fluent in Hebrew, and, in 1953, lived for a short time on a kibbutz in Israel. Part of his towering account of the US-Israeli relationship now follows.

Despite the remarkable level of U.S. support for Israel, it would be an error to assume that Israel represents the major U.S. interest in the Middle East. Rather, the major interest lies in the energy reserves of the region, primarily in the Arabian peninsula. A State Department analysis of 1945 described Saudi Arabia as “…a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” The U.S. was committed to win and keep this prize. Since World War II, it has been virtually an axiom of U.S. foreign policy that these energy reserves should remain under U.S. control. A more recent variant of the same theme is that the flow of petrodollars should be largely funneled to the U.S. through military purchases, construction projects, bank deposits, investment in Treasury securities, etc. It has been necessary to defend this primary interest against various threats.

A third threat from which the region must be “defended” is the indigenous one: the threat of radical nationalism [independent secular nationalism]. It is in this context that the U.S.-Israel “special relationship” has matured. In the early 1950s, the U.S.-Israel relationship was decidedly uneasy, and it appeared for a time that Washington might cement closer relations with Egyptian President Nasser, who had some CIA support. These prospects appeared sufficiently worrisome so that Israel organized terrorist cells within Egypt to carry out attacks on U.S. installations (also on Egyptian public facilities) in an effort to drive a wedge between Egypt and the U.S.,[1] intending that these acts would be attributed to ultranationalist Egyptian fanatics.

From the late 1950s, however, the U.S. government increasingly came to accept the Israeli thesis that a powerful Israel is a “strategic asset” for the United States, serving as a barrier against indigenous radical nationalist threats to American interests, which might gain support from the USSR. A recently declassified National Security Council memorandum of 1958 noted that a “logical corollary” of opposition to radical Arab nationalism “would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-West power left in the Near East.” Meanwhile, Israel concluded a secret pact with Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia. According to David Ben-Gurion’s biographer, this “periphery pact” was encouraged by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and was “long-lasting.” Through the 1960s, American intelligence regarded Israel as a barrier to Nasserite pressure on the Gulf oil-producing states, a serious matter at the time, and to Russian influence. This conclusion was reinforced by Israel’s smashing victory in 1967, when Israel quickly conquered the Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, the last, after violating the cease-fire in an operation ordered by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan without notifying the Prime Minister or Chief of Staff.

The Israeli thesis that Israel is a “strategic asset” was again confirmed by Israel’s moves to block Syrian efforts to support Palestinians being massacred by Jordan in September 1970, at a time when the U.S. was unable to intervene directly against what was perceived as a threat to U.S. clients in the Arab world. This contribution led to a substantial increase in U.S. aid. In the 1970s, U.S. analysts argued that Israel and Iran under the Shah served to protect U.S. control over the oil-producing regions of the Gulf. After the fall of the Shah, Israel’s role as a Middle East Sparta in the service of American power has evoked increasing American support.

At the same time, Israel aided the U.S. in penetrating Black Africa with substantial secret CIA subsidies—supporting Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, Idi Amin in Uganda, Mobutu in Zaire, Bokassa in the Central African Republic, and others at various times—as well as in circumventing the ban on aid to Rhodesia and South Africa,[2] and more recently, in providing military and technological aid, as well as many advisers, for U.S. clients in Central America. An increasingly visible alliance between Israel, South Africa, Taiwan and the military dictatorships of the southern cone in South America has also proven an attractive prospect for major segments of American power. Now, Israel is surely regarded as a crucial part of the elaborate U.S. base and backup system for the Rapid Deployment Force ringing the Middle East oil producing regions. These are highly important matters that deserve much more attention than I can give them here.

Had it not been for Israel’s perceived geopolitical role—primarily in the Middle East, but elsewhere as well—it is doubtful that the various pro-Israeli lobbies in the U.S. would have had much influence in policy formation, or that the climate of opinion deplored by Peled and other Israeli doves could have been constructed and maintained. Correspondingly, it will very likely erode if Israel comes to be seen as a threat rather than a support to the primary U.S. interest in the Middle East region, which is to maintain control over its energy reserves and the flow of petrodollars.

Support for the concept of Israel as a “strategic asset” has, then, been considerable among those who exercise real power in the U.S., and this position has regularly won out in internal policy debate, assisted, to some extent, by domestic political pressures.

But why exactly did the US-Israeli relationship become like it is now during 1967-70? Chomsky answers that too in an interview sourced from which you can find here. His explanation now follows below.

The US-Israeli relationship in its current form began in 1967. In 1967, Israel performed an enormous service for the US. It destroyed independent secular Arab nationalism, which was considered a major threat. The oldest and most valued US ally is Saudi Arabia — that is where most of the oil is and Saudi is probably the most extreme fundamentalist Islamic tyranny in the world and the main US ally. In fact, most of the time the US is supporting radical Islamists against secular nationalists.

The major centre of Arab nationalism was Nasser’s Egypt – Saudi Arabia and Egypt were fighting a proxy war in Yemen. Israel destroyed Nasser’s secular nationalism, and that’s a tremendous boost to US power. Nasser was considered a great threat and it was feared that Nasser might use the region’s resources for the benefit of its people, rather than to the benefit of the west, and at that point, the relationship was firmed up.

In 1970, something even more important happened. The Palestinians were becoming an organised, secular nationalist movement, which is frightening [to the US]. They were in confrontation with Jordan, a US- British ally. In fact, the Jordanian army was slaughtering [the Palestinians]. It looked briefly as if Syria might intervene to protect Palestinians and that was considered a major threat to the Hashemite monarchy and also to the gulf tyranny in Saudi and the others.

The US could not intervene at the time because it was tied up in Indochina. Israel – at US request – mobilised its forces and Syria had to back off. At that point, US aid to Israel quadrupled. That was essentially the end of secular nationalism in the Arab world. Since then Israel has become a major US strategic asset. It’s a western implant right at the periphery of the energy-producing region.

The US’ second closest ally is Turkey, another part of NATO in this case, but another kind of US base for the control of the energy producing regions and to protect the monarchies against their own populations. Israel has been an important part of that, but it has also provided all kinds of secondary services to the US, which follows from its relationship of dependency.

For example, when the US and Britain wanted to evade sanctions against South Africa as they did, one of the ways they did that was through Israel, which was pleased to have open connections with the apartheid state – they regarded themselves as in a similar situation. That even extends to Southeast Asia when Carter wanted to increase US support for Indonesian aggression in East Timor, which was slaughtering the population. There were congressional barriers, so the US couldn’t support Indonesia directly, so they got Israel to send US jets into Indonesia. In Central America, it’s all over the place. It’s a strategic alliance that has been very valuable to the US.

Okay, so that covers the US-Israeli relationship and why the US supports Israel so assiduously. But what support does Israel actually receive from its relationship with the US? It surely needs support if it’s to hold up its end of the bargain, but what exactly does that involve? To answer this, we again turn to Chomsky’s “Fateful Triangle”. In brief, Chomsky sums up US support for Israel on three levels: diplomatic, material and ideological. However, Chomsky assumes that people already understand that, despite whatever you might believe about the international balance of order, power and democracy, the US is the world’s supreme power.

As by far the world’s leading economic and military power since World War 2, and as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, which accords the US veto power over any Security Council Resolutions it doesn’t like, the US is virtually not bound by anything. It obeys the laws which suit it, disregards whatever institutions it doesn’t like, and does whatever it wants because, as the world’s great power, the US doesn’t have anything which can hold it to account, other than its domestic population. Thus, with no one and nothing that can hold the US to account, it acts however it chooses. Since 1967-70, that’s included supporting Israel as a client state which enforces the US’s will and protects its interests in the Middle East, which basically comes down to control of Middle East oil reserves as a source of colossal revenue for the state and US corporations, and a kind of leverage by which to force other states to follow Washington’s orders. As the godfather of the world, the US has no boundaries but what the currently propagandised American public can impose upon it, meaning that right now no boundaries exist.

Fully discussing and proving this point is in itself a long discussion we can’t get into now, but if you’d like to read more about it then “Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media” by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky gives an excellent analysis and abundant proof of how states use propaganda to do whatever they please and get away with it. For now, though, with the global hegemony of the US established and its consequences laid out, I’ll return to the excerpt from Chomsky’s “Fateful Triangle”, Chapter 2, pages 48-53, which detail the US support that enables Israel to be the regional enforcer which, since 1967-70, it’s been able, obliged and willing to be thanks to its relationship with the US.

The relationship between the United States and Israel has been a curious one in world affairs and in American culture. Its unique character is symbolized by recent votes at the United Nations. For example, on June 26, 1982 the United States stood alone in vetoing a UN Security Council resolution calling for simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli and Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, on the grounds that this plan “was a transparent attempt to preserve the P.L.O. as a viable political force,” evidently an intolerable prospect for the U.S. government. A few hours later, the U.S. and Israel voted against a General Assembly resolution calling for an end to hostilities in Lebanon and on the Israel-Lebanon border, passed with two “nays” and no abstentions. Earlier, the U.S. had vetoed an otherwise unanimous Security Council resolution condemning Israel for ignoring the earlier demand for withdrawal of Israeli troops. The pattern has, in fact, been a persistent one.

More concretely, the special relationship is expressed in the level of U.S. military and economic aid to Israel over many years. Its exact scale is unknown, since much is concealed in various ways. Prior to 1967, before the “special relationship” had matured, Israel received the highest per capita aid from the U.S. of any country. Commenting on the fact, Harvard Middle East specialist Nadav Safran also notes that this amounts to a substantial part of the unprecedented capital transfer to Israel from abroad that constitutes virtually the whole of Israel’s investment—one reason why Israel’s economic progress offers no meaningful model for underdeveloped countries. It is possible that recent aid amounts to something like $1000 per year for each citizen of Israel when all factors are taken into account. Even the public figures are astounding.[3] For fiscal years 1978 through 1982, Israel received 48% of all U.S. military aid and 35% of U.S. economic aid, worldwide. For FY 1983, the Reagan administration requested almost $2.5 billion for Israel out of a total aid budget of $8.1 billion, including $500 million in outright grants and $1.2 billion in low-interest loans.

In addition, there is a regular pattern of forgiving loans, offering weapons at special discount prices, and a variety of other devices, not to mention the tax deductible “charitable” contributions (in effect, an imposed tax), used in ways to which we return. Not content with this level of assistance from the American taxpayer, one of the Senate’s most prominent liberal Democrats, Alan Cranston of California, “proposed an amendment to the foreign aid bill to establish the principle that American economic assistance to Israel would not be less than the amount of debt Israel repays to the United States,” a commitment to cover “all Israeli debts and future debts,” as Senator Charles Percy commented.

This was before the Lebanon war. The actual vote on foreign aid came after the invasion of Lebanon, after the destruction of much of southern Lebanon, the merciless siege and bombardment of Beirut, the September massacres, and Israel’s rapid expansion of settlement in the occupied territories in response to Reagan’s plea to suspend settlement in accord with his peace proposals, which Israel rejected. In the light of these events, the only issue arising in Congress was whether to “punish” Israel by accepting the President’s proposal for a substantial increase in the already phenomenal level of aid—what is called taking “a get-tough approach with Israel”—or to take a softer line by adding even more to the increases that the President requested, as the Senate and most liberals demanded. Fortunately, the press was sufficiently disciplined so that the comic aspects of this characteristic performance were suppressed. The consequences of this message of approval to Israel for its recent actions on the part of the President and Congress are not at all comic, needless to say.

It should be noted that in theory there are restrictions on the use of American aid (e.g., cluster bombs can be used only in self-defense; development funds cannot be spent beyond Israel’s recognized—i.e., pre-June 1967—borders). But care has been taken to ensure that these restrictions will not be invoked, though the illegal use of weapons occasionally elicits a reprimand or temporary cut-off of shipments when the consequences receive too much publicity. As for the ban on use of U.S. funds for the settlement and development programs that the U.S. has officially regarded as illegal and as a barrier to peace (i.e., beyond the pre-June 1967 borders), this has never been enforced, and the aid program is designed so that it cannot be enforced: “in contrast to most other aid relationships, the projects we fund in Israel are not specified,” Ian Lustick observes, and no official of the State Department or the aid program has “ever been assigned to supervise the use of our funds by the Israeli government.”

For comparison, one may consider the U.S. aid program to Egypt (the largest recipient of non-military U.S. aid since Camp David), which is run by an office of 125 people who supervise it in meticulous detail. Many knowledgeable Egyptians have been highly critical of the aid program, alleging that it reflects American rather than Egyptian priorities, financing U.S. imports which must be brought on American ships and U.S. consultants, when trained personnel are available in Egypt for a fraction of the cost. They also note the emphasis on the private sector, “pay[ing] Mid-west farmers for wheat which could be grown at half the price in Egypt” (according to a former AID director), and in general the infiltration of Egyptian society to the extent that some perceive a threat to Egyptian national security.

These examples illustrate the diplomatic and material support that the U.S. provides for Israel. A concomitant, at the ideological level, is the persistence of considerable illusion about the nature of Israeli society and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since 1967, discussion of these issues has been difficult or impossible in the United States as a result of a remarkably effective campaign of vilification, abuse, and sometimes outright lying directed against those who dared to question received doctrine.[4]

This fact has regularly been deplored by Israeli doves, who have been subjected to similar treatment here. They observe that their own position within Israel suffers because of lack of support within the U.S., where, as General (Res.) Mattityahu Peled observed, the “state of near hysteria” and the “blindly chauvinistic and narrow-minded” support for the most reactionary policies within Israel poses “the danger of prodding Israel once more toward a posture of calloused intransigence.” The well-known Israeli journalist and Zionist historian Simha Flapan describes “the prejudice of American Jewry” as now “the major obstacle to an American-Palestinian and Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, without which there is little chance to move forward in the difficult and involved peace process.” In concentrating on the role of American Jewry, these Israeli writers focus much too narrowly, I believe.

To cite one last example, an article in the American Jewish press quotes a staff writer for Ha’aretz (essentially, the Israeli New York Times) who says that “you American Jews, you liberals, you lovers of democracy are supporting its destruction here by not speaking out against the government’s actions,” referring to the wave of repression in the occupied territories under the “civilian administration” of Professor Menachem Milson and General Ariel Sharon introduced in November 1981 (see chapter 5, sections 5-8). He goes on to explain the plans of Begin and Sharon: to drive a large number of Arabs out of the West Bank, specifically, the leaders and those with a potential for leadership, “by every illegal means.” How?

“You activate terrorists to plant bombs in the cars of their elected mayors, you arm the settlers and a few Arab quislings to run rampages through Arab towns, pogroms against property, not against people. A few Arabs have been killed by settlers. The murderers are known, but the police are virtually helpless. They have their orders. What’s your excuse for not speaking out against these violations of Israeli law and Jewish morality?”

The settlers, he adds, are “Religious Jews who follow a higher law and do whatever their rabbis tell them. At least one of the Gush Emunim rabbis has written that it is a mitzvah [religious duty] to destroy Amalek [meaning, the non-Jewish inhabitants], including women and children.” The Ha’aretz journalist adds that his journal has “a file of horror stories reported to us by soldiers returning from occupation duty in the West Bank. We can refer to them in general terms—we can rail against the occupation that destroys the moral fibre and self-respect of our youth—but we can’t print the details because military censorship covers actions by soldiers on active duty.” One can imagine what the file contains, given what has been printed in the Israeli press.

It should be noted, in this connection, that many crucial issues that are freely discussed in the Hebrew press in Israel and much that is documented there are virtually excluded from the American press, so that the people who are expected to pay the bills are kept largely in the dark about what they are financing or about the debates within Israel concerning these matters. Many examples will be given below.

The dangers posed to Israel by its American supporters have consistently been realized, leading to much suffering in the region and repeated threat of a larger, perhaps global war.

The US-Israeli relationship thus emerged and has since continued to grow and deepen along those lines. Essentially, the consequence has been that, as a client state of the US serving as a regional Sparta, Israel can do whatever it pleases. Occasionally, when Israel’s barbarity receives too much publicity, it’ll be chided and tapped on the wrist like a misbehaved child. In extreme cases, like if, perhaps, it snubs US orders (you know, a serious offense), aid will be reduced or cut off temporarily. Fundamentally, though, Israel’s never held to account for what it does, much to the dismay of those beneath the US-Israeli iron boot, including and especially the Palestinians.

That covers Part 1 of my Reality of Israel-Palestine series. It’s not exactly my own work, but even though I could’ve written the explanation myself, I didn’t see the point since I would’ve drawn heavily on “Fateful Triangle” and I have no interest in trying to compete with Chomsky. So even though, unlike my other posts so far, it’s mostly not my original work, I hope you don’t mind and you enjoyed the article. As soon as I can, I’ll post Part 2 of the series: “Israel’s Wars: Realities and Myths,” which will take the US-Israeli relationship and apply it to some of the wars and conflicts which Israel has waged and participated in since it was created in 1947, including the so-called War of Independence during 1947-49, the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, the Six Days War in 1967, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Lebanon War in 1982, the First Intifada in 1987 and the Second Intifada in 2000. Below are the footnotes which’d be in their proper places above if not for formatting problems. They’re also definitely worth reading.

[1] The official in charge of these operations, Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, became Secretary-General of the Histadrut (the socialist labor union). According to the respected Israeli journalist Nahum Barnea, Lavon gave orders that were “much more severe” than those leading to the terrorist operations in Egypt, including an attempt “to poison the water sources in the Gaza Strip and the demilitarized zones” (Davar, Jan. 26, 1979). He does not indicate whether these alleged orders were executed.

[2] UPI, Boston Globe, May 16, 1982: the item reads, in toto, “American-made helicopters and spare parts went from Israel to Rhodesia—now Zimbabwe—despite a trade embargo during the bitter war against guerrillas, the Commerce Department has disclosed.” The Labor Party journal quotes the head of South Africa’s military industry as saying that Israeli “technological assistance permits South Africa to evade the arms embargo imposed upon it because of its racial policies” (Davar, Dec. 17, 1982). Yediot Ahronot, citing the London Times, reports that “Israeli technicians are helping South Africa evade the French military embargo” by transferring and repairing French armaments in Israeli hands (Oct. 29, 1981). Close relations with South Africa were established by the Rabin Labor government in the mid-1970s and remain warm, because, as Minister of Industry and Commerce Gidon Pat recently stated in Pretoria, “Israel and South Africa are two of the only 30 democracies in the world.” Similarly, Gad Yaakovi of the Labor Party “praised the economic and ‘other’ [i.e., military] relations with South Africa in a television interview” in Israel, Yoav Karni reports, adding that if he had said similar things in Britain, Holland or Sweden he would have lost his membership in the Social Democratic party, though his remarks caused no distress in the Israeli Labor Party.

[3] The General Accounting Office (GAO) has informed Congress that the actual level of U.S. aid may be as much as 60% higher than the publicly available figures. This is the preliminary result of a detailed study of U.S. aid to Israel by the GAO. “A major issue could develop next year [1983] over how much of the GAO study may be made public.” James McCartney. Philadelphia Inquirer, August 25, 1982.

[4] Israeli intelligence apparently contributes to these efforts. According to a CIA study, one of its functions is to acquire “data for use in silencing anti-Israel factions in the West,” along with “sabotage, paramilitary and psychological warfare projects, such as character assassination and black propaganda.” “Within Jewish communities in almost every country of the world, there are Zionists and other sympathizers, who render strong support to the Israeli intelligence effort. Such contacts are carefully nurtured and serve as channels for information, deception material, propaganda and other purposes.” “They also attempt to penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize the opposition.”